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1. Introduction
The assessed quality of both the research and the teaching carried out in university departments is of increasing
importance to their perceived academic success and continuing vitality. This is particularly so in a higher
education system, such as that in the UK, where there are now in operation formalised mechanisms for such
quality assessment at the level of individual academic departments. The resultant evaluations of their research
and teaching quality are likely to become of even greater significance with increased competition between
universities for research funding, that is itself under pressure from tighter public expenditure constraints, and for
students facing rising tuition fees seeking greater perceived value for money from investment in their own human
capital. An increased emphasis on assessed teaching quality is illustrated by the recent UK Government White
Paper (DBIS, 2011) Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, which envisages “a more dynamic
sector in which popular institutions can grow and where all universities must offer a good student experience to
remain competitive” (ibid, p. 5), with published measures of student satisfaction with different aspects of their
higher education teaching forming a key part of the desired process of “well-informed students driving teaching
excellence” (ibid, p. 28).
With individual academic Departments in the UK already under pressure to maintain or improve the research
quality assessments that they received in the most recent Research Assessment Exercise (HEFCE, 2008) in the
forthcoming Research Excellence Framework exercise to be completed in 2014 (HEFCE, 2011), important
questions arise as to the joint feasibility of improvements in all the desired directions of teaching and research
under tight resource constraints, and the nature of the frontier of the feasible set in this context. While
techniques, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (see e.g. Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007) and Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) (see e.g. Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), exist for attempting to empirically assess the extent
of such feasible improvements, there is a need to examine their appropriateness for analysing the extent of
improvements that are feasible in the assessed quality of both research and teaching for individual academic
Departments. In this paper, we pursue this examination firstly using a theoretical analysis and secondly by
analysing empirical data for higher education Departments of Economics in the UK.
2. The Achievement Frontier Between Research and Teaching Quality
Let {1,..., } s   be the set of academic Departments in which we are interested. Each Department j   is
assumed to be assessed on its quality of output from its activities in a number of directions. Direction 0 k  will
designate its research activity that is assessed under a process similar to the RAE and which is assumed here to
focus on the quality of the research output of its research-active members of its academic staff. Directions
1,..., k K  will designate different aspects of its teaching activities that are assessed under a process similar to
the NSS that focuses on responses per student to questionnaires on their degree of satisfaction with the different
aspects of teaching within the Department. Each Department makes use of academic staff time and supporting
resources in these different directions. The index of real resource kj r devoted to activity k by Department j is
assumed to be positively related to its use of academic staff time kj t and supporting resources kj z via a Cobb-
Douglas production function of the form:
1 0,...,
k k
kj k kj kj kj kj kj r A x z where x a t for k K
      (2.1)3
where kj a is a parameter which reflects the ability level of the academic staff which Department j deploys in
direction k, and 1 k   and k A are positive constants. In the case of research, 0 0 , j j r t and 0 j z are measured in
terms of resources per research-active member of the Department, and given a value of zero if there are no
research-active members of the Department. In the case of teaching, , kj kj r t and kj z are measured in terms of
resources per student. Department j can purchase supporting resources at a price of 2  per unit of kj z , and can
hire academic staff time at a wage 1kj  per unit of kj x , so that the total wage paid by Department j for activity k
increases with the time spent on this activity and with the ability level of the staff involved. Its cost function for
devoting the level of real resource kj r to activity k is therefore given by:
1 1 *
1 2 1 2 1 2 , ( , , ) [min : 0 ] ( / ) ( / (1 )) /
k k k k
jk kj
kj kj kj kj kj kj kj kj k kj kj kj kj k k k x z C r C x z r A x z r A
           
         (2.2)
Synergies may exist between its different activities, so that a high level of resources devoted to research by
Department j may succeed in boosting the extent to which students find its teaching intellectually stimulating.
Similarly, more resources devoted to making the Department’s teaching intellectually stimulating, by keeping its
courses up to date in their content, may stimulate increased research output by the Department. Negative
synergies are also, however, possible, with a greater research orientation of the Department possibly resulting in
tougher standards for awarding degree classifications within the Department, that may result in lower levels of
student satisfaction in some directions. The extent of these synergies may be represented by the elements in the
matrix B for determining the overall value kj v of the real resources that impact upon the quality assessment of
activity k within Department j , with:
0 0
0 0
1,..., , [ ], 0 , 0,...,
K K
j h hj kj kh hj kh kk
h h
v b r and v b r for k K where B b b for k h K
 
        (2.3)
with kh b for k h  positive, zero or negative according to the direction of the synergy between activities k and h
.
The quality of any given item of research that is produced by a research-active member of academic staff in
Department j is assumed to be given by:
kj kj kj y v    (2.4)
for 0 k  , which contains a stochastic element 0 j  that is assumed to be iid
2
01 (0, ) N  , reflecting the
serendipitous nature of research outcomes. Similarly, the underlying quality of teaching within Department j is
assumed to be given by (2.4) for 1,..., k K  , where the stochastic elements kj  are assumed to be iid
2
1 (0, ) k N  ,
and to reflect influences upon the underlying teaching quality that are unrelated to resourcing levels.
The assessment of the quality of research that is produced is assumed to be via an evaluation process of
submitted publications and other research outputs according to their assessed quality in a Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE), such as was completed for UK universities in 2008. The assessment of the quality of teaching by
Department j in direction k is assumed to be also via questionnaires to students that rank the quality of teaching
in direction k into a number of discrete grades.4
Specifically, we will assume that the underlying quality kj y of Department j’s activity in direction 0,..., k K  will
be given an assessed quality of
*
kj k y g  (where a higher value of k g indicates a higher grade) according to
whether it falls within the grading thresholds for grade k g given by:
*
, , 1 , 1 , k k k k kj k k g kj kj k g kj k g k g y g if y where                 (2.5)
k g  is here the expected level of the quality in direction k that must be achieved to secure at least a grade k g
rating. However, in addition to this expected level in (2.5), there exists a degree of uncertainty, as reflected in the
stochastic term kj  , surrounding the precise quality thresholds which are applied within the assessment processes
for mapping any given underlying quality in direction k, as given by the continuous variable kj y , into a discrete
assessed quality grade k g . For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that this uncertainty affects all threshold
margins for direction k equally, with the kj  iid
2
2 (0, ) k N  . (2.4) - (2.5) imply for 0,..., : k K 
* 2 2 2 2
, , 1 1 2 (0, ) kj k k g kj kj k g kj kj kj kj k k k k y g if v v where is N and                        (2.6)
The different grades of assessed quality in direction k are in turn assumed to be weighted by the assessment
process, according to a weighting function ( ) k k w g , to produce an overall measure of the quality of activity k . In
the case of the RAE, the weights attached by HEFCE (2010a) within its associated QR funding formula are 9 for a
grade of 4*, 3 for a grade of 3*, 1 for a grade of 2* and 0 for 1* and unclassified, so that
0 0 0 0 (4*) 9, (3*) 3, (2*) 1, (1*) 0 w w w w     . In the case of the NSS, grades 1 to 5 correspond to the assessed
strength of student agreement with statements, such as “staff have made the subject interesting”, on different
aspect of teaching, with grade 1 corresponding to “definitely disagree”, grade 2 to “mostly disagree”, grade 3 to
“neither agree nor disagree” , grade 4 to “mostly agree” and grade 5 to “definitely agree”. The weighting function
used in several published reports on the results of the NSS (see e.g. HEFCE, 2010b) is that of 1 for grades 4 and 5,
with zero otherwise. We will assume more generally that:
( ) ( 1) 1,..., ( ) ( 1) 1,..., k k k k k k k k k k k k w g w g for all g g and w g w g for some g g        
(2.7)
where k g 
is the highest classified grade and 0 is the lowest classified grade for direction 0,..., . k K 
The resultant expected assessed quality of output of Department j in direction k is:
, 1 ,
0
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k
g
kj k k k g kj k k g kj k
g
q w g N v N v     

    

(2.8)
for each assessed item, where N is the cumulative normal distribution function. We will assume that the total
number of publications which Department j submits for assessment, and the number of students in Department
j , are both large enough to make the actual average assessed quality of output in each direction arbitrarily close
to its expected value. For any given set of values of the parameters , ,
k g k k g   etc, (2.8) implies that for
0,..., k K  the kj q are functions of the form:5
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(2.9)
where is the normal density function. If we assume that the highest quality threshold , 1 k k g    in (2.7) – (2.9) goes
to and that the lowest quality threshold ,0 k  goes to  , so that evaluations are possible over the entire
spectrum of underlying performance, we have from (2.5), (2.8) – (2.9):
,
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(2.10)
From (2.3), (2.9) and (2.10) there exists an inverse function
1( ) k k kj f q 
  such that the level of real resource
inputs in each direction that is required to achieve an expected quality of output of kj q in each direction is given
by :
1
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1
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

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From (2.2), the overall total cost of achieving the expected output quality vector 0 ( ,..., ) j j Kj q q q  for j m
students in Department j when the number of research-active members of academic staff in Department j is
j n , is therefore:
1
0 1 2
1
( , , ) ( / ) ( / (1 )) /
h h
K
j j j j j j j hj hj hj hj hj hj h h h
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(2.12)
Associated with any given level j C of the overall total cost j C in (2.12) we may define the production possibility
frontier (PPF) given by:
1 0 ( ,..., ; , , ) max . .
kj
oj j Kj j j j j r q q q C m n q s t    (2.11), (2.12) & ( , , ) j j j j j C q m n C  (2.13)
Under a university funding regime similar to that of HEFCE’s (2010a), with its QR element of research funding, the
income which any Department j receives will itself, however, increase with the value of its assessed quality-
weighted volume of research, as measured by 0 j j n q . In addition, the research grant income, j G , that
Department j receives from other sources may depend upon its number, j n , of research-active members of
academic staff and upon the average assessed quality of their research, as reflected in 0 j q , so that
0 ( , ) j j j G G n q  . The funding for teaching that Department j receives under the type of funding regime we are
considering here includes a positive monetary amount, 1  , for each of the specified number, j m , of students
which the central government funding agency agrees to fund, and for whom teaching quality assessments are
required. However, we can also allow here for the possibility that Department j receives additional net income,
j H , from overseas postgraduate students who are not included in this central government-funded total, and6
who fall outside the teaching quality assessment regime we are considering here. Department j ’s ability to
attract, and charge higher fees to, such students is assumed here to depend upon its academic reputation, as
reflected in its research assessment 0 j q . It may also depend upon the Department’s teaching assessments, such
that ( ) j j H H q  . Even if the teaching assessments do not relate directly to postgraduate teaching, as has been
the case of the NSS for the period we are considering , the assessments are assumed to be widely available and
used in the construction of published university league tables to which prospective postgraduate students may
pay attention. Department j ’s overall net income will therefore equal:
1 2 0 ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) j j j oj j j j j j j Z m n q G n q H q Z q m n        (2.14)
where 2 0   is the central government research funding per quality-weighted volume of research produced.
Since the assessed research quality, 0 j q , of Department j is assumed to influence its academic standing in the
eyes of academics, the wage 1kj  which it must pay to attract and retain the time inputs of academics of any
given level of ability is also assumed to depend upon 0 j q , implying wage functions of the form:
1 1 0 ( ) 0,..., kj k j q for k K     (2.15)
per unit of ability-weighted time input kj x , but with the price 2  of supporting resources assumed to be
independent of 0 j q . In particular, we will assume that ceteris paribus research-active academic staff of a given
level of research ability are willing to accept a lower wage per unit of their ability-weighted time input to work in
a Department that is more prestigious according to its 0 j q research rating. If this (marginal) effect becomes
greater the greater 0 j q becomes, we have:
2 2
10 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 ( / )/ 0 ( / )/ 0 j j q and q                 (2.16)
For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that the research grant income function of Department j in (2.14) is
of the form:
2
0 ( , ) ( ) / ( ) 2 , 0 ( )/ 0 j j oj j j j oj j oj oj G n q q n n with G n q n and q q                 (2.17)
so that the additional income which an additional research-active member of academic staff generates for
Department j is an increasing function of the assessed quality of its research output, but declines with j n when
there is some degree of spreading of the available research funds across Departments of different sizes. If the
number of research-active academic staff which Department j hires is chosen to maximise its resource income
net of its resource costs, we have from (2.11), (2.12), (2.14), (2.15) and (2.17):
0 2 0 0 0
0
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )]/ 2
K
j j j j j o j h h hj
h
n n q q q c q q     

     (2.18)
for ( ) 0 j j n q  , with zero research-active staff hired if ( ) 0 j j n q  , and where7
1
0 1 0 2 ( ) ( ( ) / ) ( / (1 )) / 0,...,
h h
h j h j h h h c q q A for h K
     
    (2.19)
In order to identify an outer frontier of expected achievable performance for the assessed quality of
Departmental research and teaching, we can now extend the inter-relationships that we include beyond those
which are considered by the PPF in (2.13) to include the endogenous net income relationships (2.14) and (2.17) –
(2.18), and the wage functions in (2.15). This yields an expected achievement frontier (EAF) defined by:
1 ( ,..., ; ) max . .
kj
oj j Kj j oj r q q q m q st    (2.11), (2.12), (2.14) - (2.15), (2.17) - (2.18) and j j C Z  (2.20)
which specifies the achievable combinations of expected research and teaching quality assessments which are
feasible for any given value of the exogenously determined number of central government funded students, j m ,
when Department j optimises the resourcing of its different activities and its number of research-active
academic staff j n within a net-income constraint that itself depends upon its assessed academic quality.
3. Non-Convexity and the Expected Achievement Frontier
We can combine the constraints involved in (2.20) into an overall net resource constraint given by:
0 0 0 0
0 1
( , ) ( , , ( )) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) 0
K K
j j j j j j k j j j j hk h j k kj
k h
q m Z q m n q n q c q m c q q    
 
      (3.1)
with (3.1) defining the achievable level of 0 j q as an implicit function of 1 ,..., j Kj q q and j m . From (2.11) – (2.12),
(2.14) – (2.18) and (3.1), we have:
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k k jk k jk k j j hk h
h
H for k K where n c m c for k K      

        (3.2)
0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1
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K K
j j j jk k jk k j j hk h
k h
n n H where n c m c for k K          
 
                (3.3)
0 1 1 0 1 1 / , / , / , / 0, ( / ) / , . k kj j k kj k k kj k k j k k k k k where q q H H q q q c c                                 
Differentiation of (3.2) and (3.3), using (2.15) – (2.19), yields:
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0 0 ( ) / 2 1,..., kk kk jk k k k H c for k K             (3.4)
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1 0
2 ( / ) 2
K K
j j j j j jk k jk k
k k
n q n H           
 
                  (3.5)
0 0 0 0 0 0 ( / ) 1,..., k k k jk k k j j H c n q for k K               (3.6)8
where
2 2
0 1 1 0 1 / , / , / , / , ( / ) / kh k hj j kh k hj k k kj h h j h q q H H q q q                              (3.7)
and
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0 0 0 1 1
1
/ ( ( ) (1 ) ) 0,...,
K
jk k j j hk h h h j h h h h h
h
n c m c and c c q c for h K       

                 (3.8)
The expected achievement possibility set, S, can be defined as the set of all ( , ) j j q m vectors satisfying the
constraint:
( , ) 0 j j q m   (3.9)
in which the Department’s costs of its expected achievements are no greater than its associated income.
Convexity of S implies that  is quasi-concave, which in turn requires (see Arrow and Enthoven, 1961) that the
associated bordered Hessian determinants weakly alternate in sign, with:
0
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[ 2 ] 0
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D
 
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  
      (3.10)
for any 1,..., k K  . However, the necessary condition (3.10) for convexity of S is by no means guaranteed here,
even for the simple case where we have:
0 0 1 0 ( / ) , 0,..., 0 0,..., j j kk k h kh n q H H for h k K and b for h k K                (3.11)
From (2.10), we have for 0,..., k K  :
2 2
1
1/ 0 /( ) / ( ) /
k
k
G
k k k k k k k kj k k kj k
g
f and f f where f f v w g     

              (3.12)
, , ( ) ( )/ ( , , ) 0 ( , , ) ( )/
k k kj kj kj kj kj kj k g kj k g kj k and as v for v                        (3.13)
From (3.12) – (3.13) and (3.4) - (3.5), the condition 0 k f  , and hence 0 k  and 0 kk   will be satisfied here if:
,1 kj k v   (3.14)
given (2.5), (2.7) and (2.10). However, (3.14) is unnecessarily strong for 0 k  , and hence 0 kk   given (3.11),
to hold. Rather from (3.12), we require simply that:
, , , , 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )( ( ))
k k
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k k
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     

(3.15)
In the case of the 2008 RAE, for example, under the weighting system that is implicit in the associated QR funding
element adopted by HEFCE (2010a) noted above, we have
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (4*) 9, (3*) 3, (2*) 1, (1*) 0, (4*) 6, (3*) 2, (2*) 1 w w w w and hence w w w           (3.16)9
If the value of 0 j v , for example, falls between 3  and 4  , we have from (2.8) and (3.15)
0 02 0 0 0 03 0 0 (( ) / ) 0 ( ) / ) 0 j j j j v and v           . (3.15) and (3.16) then require for 0 k  :
0 04 0 0 0 03 0 0 0 02 0 0 6 ( )/ ) 2( ( ) / )) 1( ( )/ )) 0 j j j j j j v v v                  (3.17)
FIGURE 1
The maximum value which kj   can achieve can readily be shown to equal 0.2420, which occurs when
1. kj   It is then sufficient for (3.13), (3.15) and hence 0 0  to hold that:
0 04 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 ( )/ ) 3(0.2420), 1.9214 0.3192 j j j v and hence v            (3.18)
using (3.12) and the numerical values of ( )     as a function of . There is therefore a non-trivial range of
the value of the resource inputs compared to the relevant performance hurdle which can result in 0 k  and
hence 0 k f  , i.e. increasing marginal productivity of these resource inputs. Whenever ( ) 0 k k w g   , from (3.12)
and (3.13), we also have:
2 3
, , , / [ ( )(1 ) ( ) / ( )] 0
k k k k k g k k kj kj j k k g k kj k g k f w g n iff v                     (3.19)
so that a marginal raising of the hurdle level of performance in direction k for achieving a grade k g will increase
the rate of increase in the marginal productivity of more resources devoted to achievement by Department j in
direction k, so long as the value kj v of these resources is not more than one standard deviation k  away from
the grade hurdle , k k g  .
As Figure 1 illustrates, kj  in (3.12) – (3.13) is a highly non-linear function of kj  , and hence of the resourcing
level kj v . As well as there existing non-trivial ranges of the value of the resource inputs compared to the relevant
performance hurdle which can result in 0 k f  , i.e. increasing marginal productivity of these resource inputs,
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there may therefore also be non-trivial ranges of the value of the resource inputs which result in 0 0, f  i.e.
decreasing marginal productivity of these resource inputs over these ranges. SumR in both Figures 2 and 3 graphs
the value of 0 f  in (3.12) for the case where the values of 0 w  are given by (3.16) and we set
0 0,2 0,3 1, 0.5, 3       , and 0,4 7   over a range values for 0 j v from 0 to 8. As can be seen from Figures 2
and 3, the associated value of 0 f may change sign more than once over such a range.
FIGURE 2
That there may be regions in which we have, at the same time, increasing marginal productivity for both research
and teaching quality are also illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. The extent to which this occurs will depend inter alia
upon the k w  weights that are placed upon the grade improvements that are assessed by the teaching quality
exercise. Figure 2 illustrates the case where we set 1 1 1 1 (2) (3) (4) (5) 1 w w w w         , and
1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1, 3, 3.5, 4,         1,5 7   , with the total value of the resources devoted to the research and
teaching activities 0,1 k  set equal to 8. There is here more than one region here is which both SumT, which
shows the resultant value of 1 f  from (3.12), and SumR, which shows the value of 0 f , are positive, but also a
region in which they are both negative. Figure 3 illustrates the case where we instead set
1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1, 0.5, 1, 3,         1,5 4   , and
(1) (2) (3) 0, (4) (5) 1 (2) (3) (5) 0, (4) 1 k k k k k k k k k w w w w w and hence w w w w              (3.20)
for each teaching quality dimension 1,..., k K  , so that all student responses of grade 3 or below are treated as
being “not satisfied” and those of grades 4 and 5 are treated as being “satisfied”, as in HEFCE (2010b) . There is
now one region in which both 0 f and 1 f  are positive, and one region in which they are both negative. Under
condition (3.11), the convexity condition (3.10) will then switch from being broken locally in the first region of the
frontier to being satisfied locally over the second region. In addition, with SumT being close to zero and Sum R
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being positive in Figure 3 for many low values of the resources, 0 j v , devoted to research, (3.4) – (3.7) and (3.11)
may imply that the convexity condition (3.10) is broken also for many of these low values of 0 j v .
FIGURE 3
When we relax condition (3.11), there are several other important sources of potential non-convexity of the
expected achievement possibility set. The first of these are that both and 00 H may prove to be positive in
(3.5). This may in particular be true if Department j’s competitive success in securing research grant funding and
additional net income from overseas postgraduate student fees, as reflected in  in (2.17) and H in (2.14), are
decreasing functions of Department j’s ranking 0 ( ) j R q from the top of a cumulative national distribution
0 ( ) j F q of its research assessment across a total of s Departments nationally. We will then have:
0 0 0 0 0 0 ( ) ( ( )) ( ) [1 ( )], / 0 / ( ) j j j j j j q R q where R q s F q R and R q s q                
(3.21)
where 0 ( ) j q  is the density function associated with 0 ( ) j F q . We then have for 0 0 0 ( ) ( ( )/ ) j j j q q q       :
2 2 2
0 0 0 ( / ) ( ) 0, ( / )( ( )) ( / ) ( ) j j j R s q R s q R s q                         
(3.22)
with a similar equation holding also for 00 H . If Department j ’s competitive position increases significantly the
closer it gets to the top of the national distribution, we may have
2 2 / R     and
2 2 / H R   both positive, which
will yield overall positive values to and 00 H in (3.5) whenever 0 ( ) 0 j q   or whenever 0 ( ) j q   is sufficiently
small. If 0 ( ) j q  is unimodal, and 00 H will also have larger positive values the closer 0 j q is to the mode of this
distribution, reflecting the large change in the national ranking of Department j which can be achieved by a
relatively small change in its research assessment 0 j q when the Department is close to the mode of the national
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distribution. Similar reasoning will imply 0 kk H  in (3.4) if kj q impacts upon j H in a parallel way via the
national distribution for kj q , which will in turn imply 0 kk   in (3.4) whenever 0 k  and B is a diagonal matrix.
Moreover, if an improved research standing impacts upon the wage function in (2.15) via its ranking 0 ( ) j R q , so
that the further Department j is from the top of the national distribution the higher the wage premium it must
pay to attract and retain staff of a given level of ability in direction h , we will have:
2 2 2
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 ( ) ( ( )), / 0, 0, [( / )( ( )) ( / ) ( ]/ h j h j h h h h j h j h q R q R w R s q R s q                           
(3.23)
If the prestige of working in the Department increases significantly as it gets closer and closer to the top of the
national distribution, we may have
2 2
1 / 0 h R     
, with a greater weight on this term that contributes to a
larger negative value of 1h  in (3.7) - (3.8) when 0 j q is close to the mode of national distribution. In addition, we
will have 0 ( ) 0 j q   for all values of 0 j q less than or equal to the mode, confirming the overall negative value to
1h  in (3.23) for these values to 0 j q . Such negative values to 1h  and 1h  in (3.23), and hence also of jk  in (3.8)
whenever 1 k   , will reinforce the positive components to 00  in (3.5) when B is a diagonal matrix. A similar
conclusion indeed applies to any non-zero value to 0 ( / ) j j n q   in (3.5) and (2.18). Such positive components will
tend to increase the degree of non-convexity in regions in which both 0 f and 1 f  are positive, and reduce the
extent to which the local convexity requirement (3.10) holds elsewhere.
However, if the wage effect 1k  for 0 k  in (3.23) and (3.3) and the resultant value to jk  in (3.3) are strongly
negative, these positive components to 00  in (3.5) may be offset to some extent by positive elements to 0k  in
(3.6) and (3.10). A strong wage effect 1 0 k   for 0 k  will imply that boosting the Department’s research
quality significantly reduces the cost of it attracting able teachers, thereby generating a pecuniary form of positive
economy of scope that in itself reinforces the degree of local convexity of the expected achievement possibility
set.
When we relax the assumption that the synergy matrix B is diagonal, the scope for less a priori predictability of
the extent of the overall departure from convexity of the expected achievement possibility set is increased. In
particular, negative off-diagonal elements of the matrix inverse
1 [ ] hk B  
   may be generated by positive
synergies between the resources devoted to increasing research quality and those devoted to increasing some
aspects of teaching quality, such as the extent to which teaching is intellectually stimulating in its content. These
negative values of hk  for h k  will provide partial offsets to reduce the extent to which 00  and kk  are positive
in (3.4) and (3.5). Similarly, a positive value of 0k H due to complementarity between research and teaching
quality in the extent to which they increase the attractiveness of the Department to overseas students paying
higher tuition fees will provide a partial offset in (3.6) and (3.8) to the extent to which the local convexity
condition (3.10) is broken. Moreover even if 0 0 h   for 1,..., h K  , it may be the case that a higher
Departmental research performance attracts more research-orientated staff who are less willing to spend time on
other labour-intensive teaching activities, such as marking large volumes of essays, so that 1 0 h   and 1 0 h  
in (3.5) and (3.8), for these other directions 0 h . Thus while there may indeed be sections of the EAF for which
the convexity condition (3.10) is broken, its universal breach, in the form of global strict quasi-convexity of the13
function  in (3.1) that defines the EAF, is also not guaranteed. As in Figure 4, there may then be sections of the
EAF that are locally concave from above and other sections which are locally convex from above. Different
Departments may be in equilibrium at different points, such as W, A, L, M and D along the EAF. This will depend
inter alia upon their willingness in their resource allocation decisions to make trade-offs between their assessed
research quality and their assessed teaching quality. If the preferences of individual Departments between
research and teaching quality are representable by utility functions ( ) j j U q for 1,..., j s  , the second-order
conditions for a constrained maximum to ( ) j j U q subject to the constraint (3.7 ) will be satisfied if the associated
indifference curves have a sufficiently large curvature in each relevant direction, such as at points A, L or M in
Figure 4, as dependent upon the position of each individual Department’s indifference curves between their
research and teaching quality scores. The existence of sections of the EAF which are locally strictly concave from
above will, however, tend to make increases in teaching quality more costly to achieve along at least part of the
frontier in terms of the accompanying fall in research quality.
FIGURE 4
4. FDH Analysis and DEA
Once constraints on the available resources imply potential trade-offs between the time and other resources
devoted to research and to teaching activities, it becomes important to also examine empirically the nature of
the achievement possibility frontier between these different assessed outputs and the extent to which some
Departments fall inside this frontier. One approach to estimating the position of such a frontier is that of
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), which seeks to estimate a particular
functional form of a parametric production or cost function, that is subject to additive disturbance terms that are
assumed to be decomposable into a normally distributed term reflecting ability or other features of the resource
endowment of the producer, such as the vintage of their capital stock, and a half-normally distributed non-
positive disturbance term reflecting the efficiency of the producer. However, difficulties arise in this context of
finding a suitable parametric functional form that permits more than one switch between strictly convex and
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strictly concave sections of the frontier. It is notable that the coefficients of the multi-output CES cost function
which Izadi et al (2002) estimate for the quality-unadjusted volumes of output of higher education institutions in
the UK using SFA imply that the resultant cost function is strictly quasi-concave for all positive values of the
output (see also Baumol et al, 1982, p. 461), with an associated non-convex feasible set of outputs for any given
level of total expenditure . Moreover, once the assessed quality of the output becomes our main focus of interest
and funding is partially endogenous, such a single-equation estimation of a cost function through SFA becomes
less appropriate. Furthermore, while published cost data are readily available for the UK at institutional level, the
use of such aggregate institutional data “often can be misleading” according to Dunbar and Lewis (1995, p. 120)
because of “quite dissimilar production functions” across different academic disciplines, such as Chemistry and
English. The lack of published detailed Departmental cost data for individual UK Departments of Economics
presents an additional substantial impediment to such an estimation in our present context. Similarly, the lack of
reliable detailed data on the resources devoted to each separate direction of achievement by each such UK
Department impedes the direct estimation of the underlying production functions for their assessed output
quality in (2.3) – (2.5) using techniques such as ordered probit analysis (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
One main non-parametric approach which has been widely used (see e.g. Emrouznejad et al, 2008) for assessing
the efficiency and productivity of multi-output firms, and which has been applied also in the schools sector of
education (see e.g. Jesson, Mayston and Smith, 1987; Mayston and Jesson, 1988), and suggested for use also in
the higher education sector (Johnes, 1999), is that of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). When the focus of
interest is on the extent to which individual academic Departments are capable of feasible improvements in their
assessed outputs, particularly relevant here is the output-orientated version of the DEA model due to Banker,
Charnes and Cooper (1984) (BCC) , which is formulated in terms of the linear program:
1 max . . , 0, 1, ( ,..., ) 0, (1,...,1) j j j j n s t X X Y Y e e                 (4.1)
and which relaxes the earlier formulation of DEA by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) (CCR) in which constant
returns to scale are assumed (see Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007). The DEA model (4.1), in which j X and j Y are
the input and output vectors, respectively, of Department j , with 1 ( ,..., ) s X X X  and 1 ( ,..., ) s Y Y Y  ,
involves finding the maximum radial expansion in the output vector of Department j that will still be feasible
within the estimated possibility set formed by taking convex combinations of the input and output vectors of
Departments in the observed set. The reciprocal of the estimated j  coefficient is then taken to be a measure of
the effectiveness, or ‘technical efficiency’, of the Department’s actual output vector compared to what DEA takes
to be feasible based upon the frontier formed by the convex hull of all Department’s performances. However, a
major problem with the use of DEA in our current context arises when its underlying assumption of convexity of
the feasible set does not hold, but instead the actual achievement frontier is strictly concave from above over
some significant region. DEA’s comparison with projected points on this convex hull then involves a comparison
with input-output vectors which are in fact infeasible. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where WALMD represents the
actual achievement frontier for the assessed outputs for a given level of input, with a non-convex region to the
associated feasible set between points A, L and M. DEA would here estimate an efficient point such as L to have a
level of technical efficiency of only (OL/OI) < 1 based upon its comparison with the infeasible point I that lies on
the artificial frontier formed from a convex combination of the adjacent points A and M. An inefficient point, such
as P in Figure 4, that lies inside the feasible frontier WALMD, would similarly be given an excessively low efficiency
score of only OP/OI in Figure 4, and implied excessive ability to make proportional improvements of OI/OP in each15
of its outputs, compared to the proportional improvements of OL/OP that are actually feasible, with an associated
true ‘technical efficiency’ score of OP/OL > OP/OI.
Regions of non-convexity of the feasible set also have important implications for a Department’s price- or
allocative-efficiency, as a reflection of the extent to which a re-balancing of the proportions in which the different
outputs are produced may be desirable. Given the non-convex feasible set associated with the frontier WALMD in
Figure 4, the optimal overall position for a Department j with a utility function ( ) j j U q between the relevant
dimensions of achievement that has the associated indifference curves passing through points P and M in Figure 4
would be at point M. If the actual position achieved by the Department is at P, an overall value-based measure of
its effectiveness would be given by
* /
P
jP j j U U   , as dependent upon the values the Department places upon
achievements in each dimension of research and teaching within its utility function. If ( ) j j U q is homothetic, a
consistent measure of jP  is provided by the ratio OP/OJ, where J is the point of intersection of Department j’s
indifference curve with the ray OP through the origin at 0. jP  may in turn then be expressed as the product of
the technical measure of efficiency OP/OL and the value-based measure of allocative efficiency OL/OJ. Such a
measure of allocative efficiency provides a generalisation of the concept of price efficiency introduced by Farrell
(1957) for the case of linear iso-valuation curves when there is a constant price for each unit of output.
In contrast to the case of a convex feasible set considered by Farrell, the existence of non-convex regions of the
feasible set may well result in values of the measure of allocative efficiency, such as OL/OJ, which are substantially
less than one, and which are at least as great a source of the overall value-based measure of its effectiveness
being low as is its technical inefficiency. The non-convex region of the feasible set in Figure 4 involves gains from
increasing marginal productivity in individual directions along the frontier, with a greater potential allocative loss
arising if Department j does not reap these gains from specialisation in the directions of achievement that offer
the highest relative valuation according its utility function. Once one moves from a market-oriented producer
facing constant market prices for its outputs to a not-for-profit producer, such as a university Department,
producing outputs without a constant market price, knowledge of its utility function, and associated subjective
trade-offs between achievements in each relevant direction, would be required for an assessment of its value-
based allocative and overall efficiency. In this paper we therefore focus empirically upon assessing Departmental
technical efficiency, but with the identification of possible regions of non-convexity of the feasible set important
both for accurately assessing technical efficiency and for identifying regions where the issues raised by allocative
efficiency may also be particularly acute.
As noted above, DEA does not provide reliable measures of technical efficiency when there are regions of non-
convexity of the feasible set. An alternative non-parametric model for estimating the performance of
Departments, and their scope for improvement, compared to what has been shown to be feasible by the input-
output vectors of all Departments in the sample is provided by the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model developed by
Duprin et al (1984). In the context of our current focus on the assessed quality-adjusted output vector j q of each
Department j   , and its associated exogenously determined input j m , the FDH model seeks to identify the
possibility set :
0 0 0 {( , ,...., )| , ,...., } j j Kj j j Kj K m q q m m q q q q for some            (4.2)
that, as in Figure 5, involves a step function of input-output points with at least as much input, and no more
output, than the input-output vector that some existing Department    has shown to be feasible. The original16
FDH model of Duprin et al (1984), and the currently available software (DEA-solver) for estimating this model (see
Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007), involve the input-orientated mixed integer programming formulation:
min . . 0, 0, 1, {0,1} j j j j s t X X Y Y e for each                 (4.3)
However, as noted above, an output-orientation is needed in our current context to show the extent of the
feasible improvements in output quality for each Department for their given student intake, rather than the
reduction in student numbers that would be consistent with their existing output quality vector. Fortunately, we
may achieve such an output-orientated formulation of FDH analysis by considering the performance shortfall
* * ( ,..., ) j oj oj Kj Kj q q q q q      of each Department j’s existing output quality vector j q compared to the maximum
scores
* * *
0 ( ,..., )' j j Kj q q q  that Department j could have attained under the quality assessment procedure. For the
RAE this involves a maximum score of 9.0, and for each of the 13 NSS teaching quality questions it involves a
maximum score of 1.0 (i.e. 100 per cent satisfaction) under the weighting systems (3.16) and (3.21), i.e.
* * * *
0 1 13 ( , ,..., )' (9,1,...,1)' j j j j q q q q for each j     (4.4)
When we compare Department j’s existing input of j m students with some upper bound m  of all Departmental
student numbers in the sample, we can then re-orientate (4.3) to one which estimates the extent of the output
quality performance shortfall through solving:
* * min . . ( ) ( ) 0,( ) ( ) 0, 1, {0,1} j j j j j st q q Q Q m m m m e for each                        (4.5)
where
* * *
1 1 1 ( ,..., ), ( ,..., ), ( ,..., ) s s s Q q q Q q q m m m    and ( ,..., ) m m m      .
with the corresponding DEA model under the BCC formulation (see Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007, p. 91) solving
the linear program:
* * min . . ( ) ( ) 0,( ) ( ) 0, 1, 0 j j j j j st q q Q Q m m m m e for each                        (4.6)
where the results in (4.5) and (4.6) are independent of our choice of m  . As in Figure 5 (where for simplicity we
hold the input constant at m  ), each Department’s effectiveness is now assessed in terms of the extent to which
its output quality shortfall can be reduced along a ray from the origin Oformed by the maximal output vector
* Q , whilst remaining on the achievement frontier for its given level of input. In contrast to the under-estimate
which DEA generates of the effectiveness of efficient Departments along a concave-from-above section of the
actual achievement frontier, the achievement frontier which the FDH model constructs will pass through all
efficient points, such as point L in Figure 5, and hence give all such efficient Departments an effectiveness score of
100 per cent. The effectiveness score of Department P in Figure 5 will be assessed under FDH as ( / )   O H O P ,
with an additional output slack in direction k of HL that a comparison with the actual performance of
Department L suggests could be remedied in addition to the overall proportional reduction of ( / )   O H O P in
Department P’s performance shortfall in its output quality vector. Given the existence of such additional slacks, it
is of interest to record not only the overall effectiveness score ( / )   O H O P of each such Department P but also
their effectiveness scores in each relevant dimension of their output after taking account of any such additional
slacks. This can be assessed here as the ratio of their projected quality shortfall to their actual quality shortfall,17
along each relevant dimension of their output. Thus if point P in Figure 5 has coordinates 0 ( , ) kP P q q   from the
origin O, and the quality shortfall coordinates of the actual Department L with which P is being compared under
FDH are 0 ( , ) kL L q q   , Department P’s effectiveness score in teaching quality k is given by the ratio / kL kP q q   and its
effectiveness score in the research quality dimension 0is given by 0 0 / L P q q   . For non-dominated observed points,
such as D, M, L, A and W in Figure 5, on the efficiency frontier identified by FDH, their effectiveness scores in each
dimension would be 1.0.
FIGURE 5
If the points D, M, L, A and W in Figure 5 all lay along an underlying efficiency frontier to a convex feasible set, we
would not observe:
* * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) : 0 1 T i i i L L T i i L i i i
i i i
q q q q q and m m m m m for some and
  
    
  
                 (4.7)
where  is a set of points on the frontier not including L and the vector inequality  involving here a strict
inequality for at least one component, and at least weak inequalities for all components , of the relevant vectors.
If (4.7) does hold, it implies that the convex combination at T dominates the point L on the frontier, contrary to
the assumption of convexity of the feasible set. However, if there is a non-convex region to the feasible set with
an efficiency frontier passing through points such as D, M, L, A and W in Figure 5, a convex combination at a
point such as T, of the observed points A and M, may satisfy (4.7), though with T here falling outside the feasible
set. Because of its focus on convex combinations of observed points, DEA may then report a point such as L as
being inefficient, based upon a reference set of other observed points, such as A and M, involved in the convex
combination, even though FDH estimates L, A and M to be efficient. In doing so, it would confirm that (4.7) holds
for this reference set  , and hence that any efficiency frontier passing through L, A and M does not satisfy the
requirements of convexity over the region   formed by convex combinations of the points in  . Thus even if
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there is a smooth underlying efficiency frontier passing through points such as L, A and M in Figure 5, rather than
FDH’s step function, it will still not satisfy the convexity condition over this region.
5. The Empirical Results
In this section we illustrate empirically the extent of the differences which the choice of analytical technique can
make to the effectiveness estimates of individual academic Departments in the context of research and teaching
quality assessments, when we relax the strong assumption of convexity of the achievement possibility set, that is
implicit in the use of DEA, to permit possible regions of non-convexity through the use of FDH analysis. Since
research and international student fee incomes are treated as endogenous in the definition of the achievement
possibility set, our choice of the exogenous variable which we will use to allow for possible differences in the
externally imposed constraints on individual Departments will be their total home (i.e. UK) and other EU student
numbers on undergraduate or taught Masters programmes. These numbers formed the basis for an externally
driven net budget constraint for funding such students in individual institutions that was imposed by university
funding agencies for the UK, such as HEFCE (2006) and the Scottish Funding Council (see Universities Scotland,
2008), during the period of our study. While individual universities still retained some freedom on how they
allocated these totals across individual academic Departments, we will assume here that for any individual
university i the total home and other EU student numbers which any given academic Department j was permitted
to recruit was a fixed proportion ij  of university i’s total. Fortunately, data on the total home and other EU
student numbers across their principal subjects of study are available from the UK’s Higher Education Statistical
Agency (HESA), even though for many individual academic Departments of interest, such as Economics
Departments, there are no data published on individual departmental expenditure patterns.
In order to investigate empirically the achievement possibility set between assessed research and teaching
quality, we will analyse the results of the latest available Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) for our main subject
of interest in this paper, namely Economics, that was carried out in 2008 on the basis of submissions for research-
active staff on the census date of 31
st October 2007, alongside the published results for teaching quality
assessments for Economics from the National Student Survey (NSS) in the academic year 2006-7. There is a total
of 50 university Departments of Economics for which NSS results are available for this academic year, with 29 of
these having positive entries for the corresponding RAE but with a zero research quality assessment for the
remaining 21. Using the weighting systems (3.16) and (3.21), together with (4.4), we can compare the results of
applying the FDH model (4.5) to the individual Departmental research and teaching quality assessments derived
from their RAE results and their NSS scores for each of its 13 teaching quality questions, with those from the
corresponding DEA model in (4.6).
Table 1 below shows the overall result of this comparison in terms of the arithmetic means of the effectiveness
coefficients across all Departments in the sample under both FDH analysis and DEA, and the ratio between their
respective effectiveness estimates. In addition to their estimates of an overall effectiveness coefficient j  for
each Department j in (4.5) and (4.6), both FDH analysis and DEA may generate slack variables, of the additional
improvements which are possible in any given relevant dimension on top of the overall proportionate
improvements which are implicit in their estimates of the overall effectiveness coefficient j  for each
Department. If these additional improvements are positive in any given direction, it will correspondingly further
reduce the estimated effectiveness coefficient for this dimension of achievement below the overall effectiveness19
coefficient. Table 1 therefore includes the arithmetic means across the Economics Departments of the resultant
effectiveness scores for each individual dimension of achievement that are estimated by both FDH analysis and
DEA.
Overall, and for many individual dimensions of achievement, the mean value of the coefficient of effectiveness for
Economics Departments estimated by the FDH model is higher in Table 1 by a factor of more than ten per cent
times that estimated by DEA. For the NSS Q4. on whether the course was intellectually stimulating, the mean
coefficient of effectiveness found under FDH analysis was higher by a factor of more than 25 per cent times that
estimated by DEA. Across the 50 individual Departments, the effectiveness coefficients that are estimated by our
FDH analysis and DEA are positively correlated, both according to their Pearson correlation coefficients and their
Spearman rank correlation coefficients, as shown in columns (i) and (iv) in Table 2. However, all of the correlation
coefficients in columns (i) and (iv) are less than 0.8, with the exception of the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between the overall effectiveness coefficients of individual Departments that are estimated by our
FDH analysis and DEA, which is very close to 0.8. A total of 30 Departments (i.e. 60 per cent of the 50) were found
to be fully effective under our FDH analysis, with an overall effectiveness score of 1.0 and zero slacks on each
individual dimension of achievement. This is in contrast to the total of only 17 Departments (i.e. 34 per cent of the
50) which were estimated by DEA to be fully effective. All of those found to be fully effective under DEA were
found to be fully effective under FDH analysis, though not vice versa. The choice of analytical technique for
assessing effectiveness therefore makes a difference both to the rankings of individual Departments and to the
estimated scope that exists for their individual improvement along each assessed dimension of achievement.
Columns (ii) and (v) of Table 2 show the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients across the 50
Departments between the effectiveness coefficients produced by FDH analysis for each individual assessed
dimension of achievement and the raw data for these achievements by the individual Departments. These
correlation coefficients are all less than 0.6, illustrating that making judgements based simply upon the individual
raw data for these achievements, without taking account of the trade-offs which even fully effective Departments
must make between the different dimensions of achievement along an efficiency frontier, will imperfectly reflect
what is implied to be feasible by a technique, such as FDH analysis, which seeks to estimate the efficiency frontier.
This conflict appears to be greatest in the case of the NSS Q.9 on whether feedback has been sufficient to help the
student clarify things they did not understand, where the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients
between the results of our FDH analysis and the individual raw data are – 0.458 and – 0.708 respectively. If giving
feedback to individual students is labour intensive, it may indeed conflict with the resources which can be
devoted to improving other dimensions of achievement, such as research quality. When adjustment is made for
Departmental achievements in these other directions, the pattern of feasible scores for such feedback across
individual Departments may therefore differ significantly from the individual score distribution within the
unadjusted raw data.
Similar negative correlations for the NSS Q.9 are found between the raw data and the results of the DEA frontier
analysis in columns (iii) and (vi) in Table 2. For all other dimensions of achievement, the correlation coefficients
across individual Departments between the raw data scores and the results of DEA in columns (iii) and (vi) are
higher than those produced by our FDH analysis in columns (ii) and (v) respectively. As noted above, FDH analysis,
unlike DEA, permits regions of non-convexity of the feasible set, with associated increasing marginal trade-offs
between the different dimensions of achievement along the efficiency frontier. The results under FDH analysis will
in general therefore tend to bring out more strongly the conflict which exists between making judgements of
Departmental performance on the basis of the unadjusted raw data and those based upon an estimate of the20
feasible achievement frontier that takes into account these trade-offs between the different dimensions of
achievement.
Examination of the results of applying FDH analysis and DEA to the data set for individual Departments reveals
that there are 13 regions where the non-convexity condition (4.7) holds. In each of these cases, there is a
Department which FDH analysis finds to be fully effective but which DEA does not, with the Department which
FDH analysis finds to be fully effective not entering into the reference set  which DEA uses to assess its
effectiveness score.
FDH DEA FDH:DEA
Overall Effectiveness Coefficient 0.933 0.845 1.104
Research Assessment Exercise Effectiveness Coefficient 0.901 0.829 1.087
Teaching Effectiveness Coefficients on NSS Responses to:
Q1. Staff are good at explaining things 0.800 0.745 1.073
Q2. Staff have made the subject interesting 0.768 0.666 1.153
Q3. Staff are enthusiastic about what they are teaching 0.714 0.619 1.153
Q4. The course is intellectually stimulating 0.804 0.634 1.269
Q5. The criteria used in marking have been clear in advance 0.760 0.723 1.051
Q6. Assessment arrangements and marking have been fair 0.810 0.707 1.145
Q7. Feedback on my work has been prompt 0.814 0.727 1.119
Q8. I have received detailed comments on my work 0.812 0.743 1.093
Q9. Feedback on my work has helped me clarify things I did not
understand 0.863 0.764 1.130
Q10. I have received sufficient advice and support with my studies 0.808 0.740 1.092
Q11. I have been able to contact staff when I needed to 0.783 0.697 1.123
Q12. Good advice was available when I needed to make study
choices 0.790 0.755 1.047
Q22. Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the course 0.778 0.660 1.177
TABLE 1: Mean Values of the Departmental Effectiveness Scores21
Pearson Correlations Spearman Rank Correlations
EFFECTIVENESS SCORES (i)FDH-DEA(ii)FDH-Raw(iii)DEA-Raw(iv)FDH-DEA(v)FDH-Raw(vi)DEA-Raw
Overall 0.785 - - 0.801 - -
Research Assessment 0.772 0.347 0.451 0.798 0.288 0.396
NSS Q1. 0.766 0.507 0.677 0.743 0.487 0.656
NSS Q2. 0.745 0.281 0.502 0.745 0.355 0.457
NSS Q3. 0.783 0.342 0.579 0.759 0.469 0.551
NSS Q4. 0.601 0.253 0.447 0.629 0.284 0.527
NSS Q5. 0.685 0.265 0.333 0.652 0.326 0.383
NSS Q6. 0.625 0.447 0.671 0.643 0.478 0.704
NSS Q7. 0.726 0.570 0.705 0.736 0.570 0.686
NSS Q8. 0.745 0.535 0.720 0.753 0.528 0.699
NSS Q9. 0.620 -0.458 -0.708 0.648 -0.468 -0.738
NSS Q10. 0.742 0.479 0.624 0.748 0.509 0.607
NSS Q11. 0.717 0.315 0.529 0.701 0.225 0.462
NSS Q12. 0.791 0.394 0.498 0.775 0.381 0.478
NSS Q22. 0.676 0.462 0.784 0.666 0.507 0.781
TABLE 2: Correlation Coefficients Across individual Departments in Effectiveness Scores
6. Conclusion
With universities and their academic Departments under increasing pressure to improve the assessed quality of
their research and teaching in the UK and elsewhere, the estimation of the feasible set of joint achievements
which are possible in each relevant direction becomes of heightened importance. In estimating the associated
achievement possibility frontier based upon what has been demonstrated to have been achievable by existing
Departments, account must be taken of the dependence of the assessed quality of research and teaching upon
the mapping of what may be underlying continuous variables into a limited number of discrete quality grades, via
associated quality thresholds. The existence of such thresholds is found to generate both regions of increasing,
and regions of decreasing, marginal productivity of increased effort, ability and supporting resources in the
presence of stochastic elements in the quality production and assessment processes. The possibility of non-
convex regions of the feasible set of assessed quality outcomes is further increased by the endogeneity of several22
elements of Departmental income, and of its ability to attract and retain able staff, being themselves dependent
upon the assessed quality of the Department’s output and associated academic reputation.
In the presence of such non-convex regions, the empirical estimates of the extent to which individual academic
Departments can improve their performance in each relevant direction depend more critically upon the choice of
the analytical technique used to estimate the associated achievement possibility frontier. In particular, the
estimates made by DEA, which has been widely used for frontier estimations in the management science and
operational research literatures (see Emrouznejad et al, 2008), are found to over-estimate the scope for such
improvements by UK Departments of Economics compared to those made by the technique of FDH analysis,
which allows for the possibility of both convex and non-convex regions of the achievement possibility set. Nearly
twice as many UK Departments of Economics are found to be operating on the efficiency frontier under FDH
analysis than under DEA, with the latter’s convexity assumption called into question by our above analysis. The
existence of non-convex regions of the feasible set in addition tends to increase the possible gains from
specialisation in a limited number of directions of achievement, and to increase the importance of issues of price
and allocative efficiency compared to those of technical efficiency. Thus, while there may be scope for
innovations that shift outwards over time the frontier that is achieved by the most technically efficient
Departments, there are also dangers of not adequately recognising the finite nature of the expected achievement
possibility set and the trade-offs which need to be made by individual Departments in determining their desired
optimal choices over a feasible set of assessed performance that is not guaranteed to be convex.
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